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Abstract—Vehicle access control and in particular access
to in-vehicle functionalities from smart mobile devices, e.g.,
phones or watches, has become an increasingly relevant topic.
Security plays a critical part, due to both a long history of
car keys that succumbed to attacks and recently reported
intrusions that use various vehicle communication interfaces
to further gain access to in-vehicle safety-critical components.
In this work we discuss existing technologies and functionalities
that should be embedded in an experimental setup that
addresses such a scenario. We make emphasis on existing
cryptographic technologies, from symmetric to asymmetric
primitives, identity-based cryptography and group signatures.
We also discuss risks associated with in-vehicle functionalities
and mitigation, e.g., intrusion detection systems.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
In-vehicle components and networks are somewhat unpre-
pared for malicious adversaries as recent investigations have
proved, e.g., [5]. Fortunately, the industry moves quickly
to adopt security technologies in recent standards, e.g.,
AUTOSAR, and the academic community has also reacted
with numerous research proposals for in-vehicle security.
Car access, traditionally mediated by mechanical keys, is a
particular area of focus due to the numerous reported attacks,
e.g., [10]. The pervasiveness of smart mobile devices, e.g.,
smartphones, smartwatches, makes them suitable candidates
for replacing traditional keys. Various attempts already exist,
e.g., [4]. The adoption of smartphones is also encouraged by
the adoption of Android inside car units which may further
ease the deployment of such access control application.
In this work we discuss about the development of an
experimental setup for car-to-smartphone interactions. Fig-
ure 1 presents the experimental setup from our past project
CSEAMAN [6] on top of which we plan to deploy a
car access system based on smartphones. Our previous
model was mostly focused on in-vehicle subsystems, e.g.,
body control module (BCM), instrument cluster, and vehicle
networks, e.g., CAN, FlexRay. The schematic of the new
setup is depicted in Figure 2. In the current setup we
introduce smartphones that connect to in-vehicle units. More
discussion on components follow in a later section. There are
several points that need to be covered by a car-to-smartphone
interaction setup. We enumerate only a few that we find to
be more relevant:
• analyzing existing functionalities in terms of both ben-
efits and risks, since security is a trade-off, a clear un-
derstanding of the associated risks is necessary (remote
control for functionalities with high degree of risk may
be unwise),
• a good selection of components that are representative
for real-world in-vehicle electronic control units (ECU)
and communication interfaces is relevant since vehicles
are highly heterogeneous having almost anything from
low-end 8-bit ECUs to high-end 32-bit ECUs with
multiple cores and low speed networks such as LIN to
high speed CAN-FD, FlexRay or even BroadRReach
(an Ethernet based bus),
• security enforcing technologies such as NFC cards
and TPM (Trusted Platform Module) are needed since
relying on software security alone may open easier
roads for attack (hardware support has its own short-
comings as flaws/backdoors may exist and are harder to
detect/patch but it adds an additional layer of security),
• correct use of security services, from regular symmet-
ric and asymmetric cryptographic primitives, to more
advanced functionalities, e.g., identity-based cryptog-
raphy, as well as the correct tool-set for protocol verifi-
cation, e.g., model-checkers and/or penetration testing
tools, intrusion detection mechanisms, etc.
Figure 1. Experimental setup of our previous project CSEAMAN
In the following sections, our discussion tries to focus
around these lines. First we give a brief overview on
existing applications and risk analysis then we discuss on
components, security countermeasures and technologies.
Figure 2. Schematic of the proposed setup for PRESENCE
II. SMARTPHONE APPS AND RISK ANALYSIS
Beside improved safety and performance, newer vehicles
provide better comfort functions for the driver and passen-
gers and an improved user interaction. Configuring all the
new features, obtaining visual feedback from the vehicle
subsystems can no longer be sustained by classic instrument
clusters with analog styled gauges and dashboard warning
lights or center consoles with traditional buttons. For this
reason, many producers already offer interfaces for accessing
cars via mobile devices. Table I summarizes some of the
remote commands provided by the car manufacturer in the
official smartphone app (this is just a short summary based
on information that we could retrieve from the Internet
since we cannot have direct access to all these cars). In
this table we considered the following applications: MyOpel
(1), MyChevrolet (2), Tesla (3), BMW Connected (4), Audi
MMI Connect (5), Mercedes me (6), Volkswagen Car-Net
Security Service (7), Volvo On Call (8) and Toyota Remote
Connect (9). The functionalities provided are very diverse,
from media control features to keyless start of the engine.
Smartphone apps are also good candidates for remote en-
abling self-driving functionalities. One example is Tesla’s
enhanced summon feature where the Tesla app is used to
send a remote request to the car to navigate autonomously
from the parking place to the driver’s location.
But all these functionalities may carry safety and security
risks. Consequently, a risk assessment is necessary for identi-
fying the most critical ones. Risk assessments methodologies
are well known and have been already applied to automotive
scenarios, e.g., [2]. Such methodologies can be used to rate
and rank the risk associated with these functionalities. The
risk has two main factors, the impact and the difficulty of
carrying out the attacks. The impact can be further refined
along three terms that take into account safety ISf , financial
cost IFin and operational aspects IOp . For each term five
classes can be defined and rated 0 to 4. Safety can be
ranked as: 0-none, 1-light, 2-severe, 3-life threatening, 4-
fatal, all these accounting for the impact on the safety of
the driver, other car occupants and traffic participants. The
financial term is ranked according to the associated financial
lost: 0-none, 1-10$, 2-100$, 3-1000$, 4-10000$. Operational
impact ranks across the alteration of the default behavior: 0-
no impact, 1-indiscernible operational impact, 2-discernible
operational impact with insignificant performance degra-
dation, 3-noticeable impact, 4- significant impact for the
driver and other traffic participants. Because we consider
the safety aspects being the most important followed by the
financial and operational ones, for each term weight factors
are employed as in [7]: αSf = 8, αFin = 4 and αOp = 2.
The impact becomes a weighted sum of the previously
described three terms: I = αSf ISf + αFinIFin + αOpIOp .
On the other hand the difficulty of the attack quantifies the
time, expertise, inside knowledge, window of opportunity
and equipment necessary for carrying out the attack. The
risk is computed as the product between the impact and
difficulty inverse: R = I× D−1.
This methodology can be applied to any of the previously
mentioned functionalities. For example, the app feature
designed to remotely start and stop the engine can have
serious consequences if an adversary can trigger it while
the vehicle is at speed in an overtaking maneuver. From the
safety perspective it could lead to fatal injuries, from the
financial one to more than 10.000$ loses, and finally from
the operational perspective it has a significant impact for
the driver and also for other traffic participants because the
power steering and power brakes will be disabled and in
some cases even the steering wheel can be locked. In this
case I = 8×4+4×4+2×4 = 56. If the same functionality
cannot be triggered while the vehicle is running, then it is
likely that it may only become annoying for the driver (as-
suming it is triggered by an adversary). There should be no
significant injuries, little financial costs and a clear alteration
of behaviour. This leads to I = 8× 1 + 4× 1 + 2× 3 = 18
which is a reduced impact.
Table I
FUNCTIONALITIES IN SOME SMARTPHONE CAR APPS
Functionality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
lock/unlock car X X X X X X X X X
keyless start – – X – – – – – –
horn X X – X – – X X –
flash the lights X X X X – – X X –
start/stop engine – X X – – – – X X
seat heaters – – X – – – – X –
HVAC on/off – – X X – X X X –
HVAC temp. – – X – – – X – –
windshield
defroster
– – – – – – X – –
vent/close
sunroof
– – X – – – – – –
enable/disable
valet mode
– – X – – – – – –
media control – – X – – – – – –
III. INTERFACES, COMPONENTS AND LIBRARIES
Car components. Our experimental setup uses a
traditional-style instrument cluster that can be seen in Figure
1. The instrument cluster is interconnected with the other car
ECUs by using a low speed CAN interface. All the interfaces
elements on the instrument cluster, dashboard lights and
gauges, are controlled by their corresponding CAN signals.
In addition to this, our setup also has an accelerator pedal
that communicates over CAN. We discuss later why these
components are relevant in the interaction with smartphones.
As in-vehicle ECU we use NXP’s S12X platform. This is
built around a main 16-bit core with an additional XGATE
CPU dedicated to reducing the load of the main CPU by
serving interrupts. The S12X family covers a wide range of
configurations enabling various communication options such
as SPI, I2C, CAN, LIN or FlexRay. Its simple programming
model, varied memory options and communication abilities
make it suitable for various automotive applications for the
body, chassis or power-train functional domains.
Android smartphones. The Android OS is now used in
car head-units and smartphones that are frequently used
to communicate with the car to access different function-
alities from a car. Smartphones usually offer three types
of communication that can be easily used to interact with
the car: Bluetooth, NFC, and WiFi. Besides classical car
key functionalities, smartphones can have even more ap-
pealing features. For example, our experimental setup has
an accelerator pedal which is periodically checked by in-
car diagnosis and monitoring systems to signal potential
malfunctions. Indeed the accelerator pedal is a safety-critical
component and its failure may lead to catastrophic accidents.
Checking if the pedal is working can be done by using
a MATLAB model of the accelerator pedal which verifies
the range (whether measured sensor voltage is too high
or too low) and the plausibility of sensor values (sensors
are out of range). Such diagnosis is commonly done by
manufacturers in environments such as MATLAB. Thanks
to MATLAB’s availability on smartphones, we can at least
imagine that this can be ported to user’s phone or imagine
any other MATLAB testing functionality that is used by
manufacturers. The MATLAB mobile apps usually work by
connecting to the MathWorks Cloud, store the files on the
MATLAB Drive and edit/run the scripts from the MATLAB
Mobile command line on the MathWorks Cloud. Another
way is to connect the MATLAB Mobile application to a
remote computer with MATLAB installed. If the computer
and the smartphone are on the same network we can access
the files on the computer from MATLAB Mobile and we
can edit/run the scripts from the MATLAB Mobile command
line on the computer. The main limitation of the MATLAB
Mobile application for our work is that it does not offer
support to open or to create a graphical user interface similar
to traditional smartphone apps. But this can be solved since
we can use the MATLAB Compiler SDK to generate a Java
Package (.jar file), e.g., based on the MATLAB files with
the accelerator pedal sensor diagnosis model. The generated
.jar file can be easy imported in Android Studio where we
can draw a graphical user interface.
Other components. We found that other components,
which are not necessary automotive-grade, such as the Rasp-
berry Pi are very handy to use in such a setup. The Raspberry
Pi 3 is a computer board capable of running various distri-
butions of Linux, e.g., Fedora, Arch and also the producer’s
official supported Raspbian operating system (based on De-
bian) which gives it the benefits of having easy-access to all
the Linux tools and high capacity of adaptation to numerous
open-source projects. The Raspberry Pi 3 microprocessor
does not have an embedded CAN controller. For this reason
we chose to use an additional SPI connected board that
encapsulates a CAN controller (Microchip MCP2515) and
a CAN transceiver (NXP TJA1050). For enabling CAN
communication on Linux the SocketCAN API provides
the necessary functions. Raspberry Pi can communicate
on Bluetooth or Wi-Fi using its on-board capabilities for
wireless networks. In order to secure the software operations
done by the Raspberry Pi using a hardware component, it
can be integrated with a TPM board in the same application
environment with the prerequisite of rebuilding and using a
modified kernel of Raspbian with support for TPM 2.0 and
configuration for the desired trusted platform module. For
this purpose we used the OPTIGA SLB 9670 TPM which
is a board with SPI interface produced by Infineon capable
of performing all TPM 2.0 operations which are specified
by the Trusted Computing Group. It can be directly attached
on the header pins of the Raspberry Pi 3 being supplied with
3.3V and being able to receive or transmit data using SPI.
So it is easy to use in an application with the Raspberry Pi if
its OS has support for the board and for TPM 2.0 operations.
As a security background for the Infineon Optiga TPM, it
is validated according to FIPS and is used by wolfSSL Inc.
to test the wolfTPM software module.
IV. SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
Traditional car keys were built around symmetric cryp-
tography. This requires a shared secret key and building
advanced functionalities such as rights delegation may be
less secure if the same secret key is shared between multiple
devices. Also, symmetric primitives cannot assure non-
repudiation which allows a malicious device to delegate its
rights to other devices and this will be harder to trace. Even
in the simpler symmetric key setup with basic functional-
ities, previous research has shown lots of flaws, e.g., the
use of poor randomness and of the insecure stream cipher
HITAG [10].
In contrast, public key primitives can be used to delegate
rights and assure non-repudiation. Still, this requires the
existence of public-key certificates and of a hierarchy of
trust. Identity-based cryptographic primitives may help in
this respect as they can be used without certificates since
the name of a principal is sufficient to derive its public-key.
Going even further, group signatures can assure anonymity
since the signature cannot be traced to a particular signer
in the group. A trusted third party can still trace the
original signer in case that a dispute arises. Symmetric
functions are fast and have modest memory requirements.
In contrast, public-key primitives require more computations
and memory. Identity-based cryptosystems come close to
regular public-key primitives and group signatures have
even higher requirements. Some research proposals have
used even more advanced cryptographic functionalities such
as secure-multiparty computation, e.g., [9]. Secure multi-
party computation can be further used to assure privacy by
processing over encrypted data whenever access is mediated
via an untrusted remote server.
We also note that not all of the proposals that we found
(for gaining car access via smartphones) included formal
arguments on security. One easy way to obtain a proof of
security would be to use a model checker. We find that
ProVerif [3] and AVIPSA [1] are the most convenient to
use. One particular problem is that there may be no support
for modelling non-standard primitives such as identity-based
schemes or group signatures. Such model-checkers may not
be able to model mathematical properties that are essential
to the security of some of the proposed protocols.
Intrusion detection systems are one particular technology
that so far seems not to have been ported on car-to-phone
communication, and in particular car access control. Given
the wide availability of wireless hacking tools, e.g., HackRF
1, it is likely that attacks will become even more common.
Various attack strategies using HackRF are discussed in [8].
One particular research direction may be detecting intrusions
in case of smartphone-to-car interactions and in particular in
car access via smartphones.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we tried to give a brief overview of tech-
nologies, tools and risks associated to vehicle-to-smartphone
interactions. Without a doubt, cryptography offers a rich
toolset for securing access to future cars and smart mobile
devices are a good vector for carrying such technologies.
These devices open the road for many new applications
and functionalities starting from car access up to real-time
car diagnosis, but it may clearly open the road to new
attacks. Further research and cooperation between industry
and academics will clearly contribute to make cars safer
and mitigate future attacks. An experimental setup is a
playground from which lessons could be learned, it is useful
both as a research and educational tool.
Acknowledgement. This work was supported by a grant
of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research
1https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/
and Innovation, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-
III-P1-1.1.-TE-2016-1317 (2018-2020) http://www.aut.upt.
ro/∼bgroza/projects/presence/index.html.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Com-
pagna, Cue´llar, et al. The AVISPA tool for the automated
validation of internet security protocols and applications.
In International conference on computer aided verification,
pages 281–285. Springer, 2005.
[2] L. ben Othmane, R. Ranchal, R. Fernando, B. Bhargava,
and E. Bodden. Incorporating attacker capabilities in risk
estimation and mitigation. Computers & Security, 2015.
[3] B. Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier
based on prolog rules. In Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, 2001., pages 82–96. IEEE,
2001.
[4] C. Busold, A. Taha, C. Wachsmann, A. Dmitrienko,
H. Seudie´, M. Sobhani, and A.-R. Sadeghi. Smart keys for
cyber-cars: secure smartphone-based nfc-enabled car immo-
bilizer. In Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Data
and application security and privacy, pages 233–242. ACM,
2013.
[5] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson,
H. Shacham, S. Savage, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner,
T. Kohno, et al. Comprehensive experimental analyses of
automotive attack surfaces. In USENIX Security Symposium.
San Francisco, 2011.
[6] B. Groza, H. Gurban, and P.-S. Murvay. An experimental
model for in-vehicle networks and subsystems. In VEHITS,
pages 326–331, 2017.
[7] E. H. Gurban, B. Groza, and P.-S. Murvay. Risk assess-
ment and security countermeasures for vehicular instrument
clusters. In 2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops
(DSN-W), pages 223–230. IEEE, 2018.
[8] O. A. Ibrahim, A. M. Hussain, G. Oligeri, and R. Di Pietro.
Key is in the air: Hacking remote keyless entry systems. In
Security and Safety Interplay of Intelligent Software Systems,
pages 125–132. Springer, 2018.
[9] I. Symeonidis, A. Aly, M. A. Mustafa, B. Mennink,
S. Dhooghe, and B. Preneel. Sepcar: A secure and privacy-
enhancing protocol for car access provision. In European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 475–
493. Springer, 2017.
[10] R. Verdult, F. D. Garcia, and J. Balasch. Gone in 360 seconds:
Hijacking with hitag2. In Proceedings of the 21st USENIX
conference on Security symposium, pages 37–37. USENIX
Association, 2012.
